Government
Ministry of Finance
Biometric checkpoints placed on the SAP functions where public money actually moves: payment runs, vendor invoicing, budgets and goods receipts.
- Customer
- National Ministry of Finance
- payment runs under dual approval
- F110
The situation
A national Ministry of Finance runs its public expenditure through SAP. Payment runs, vendor invoicing, budget modifications, purchase requisitions and goods receipts all pass through the same system, and all of them are places where an authorized account in the wrong hands becomes expensive very quickly.
This was not a precaution taken in the abstract. Years earlier the country had lost millions of dollars to a public embezzlement scandal run through its own financial systems, and the purchase of SAP, and then of bioLock, followed directly from it.
The question the Ministry set out to answer was therefore not whether its users were authorized. They were. It was whether the human performing each sensitive function was the human the authorization was granted to.
The challenge
- Establish step-up controls on the SAP functions that carry consequence
- Tightly control vendor invoicing
- Require dual approval for high-value payment runs through transaction F110
- Control the modification of budgets, purchase requisitions and goods receipts
- Stop account take-overs
- Prevent corruption and collusion inside the system
- Reduce the risk of SAP fraud generally
What was implemented
bioLock adds a granular security checkpoint to any SAP function the Ministry chooses, so the user is uniquely identified and re-authenticated before that function will execute.
- Biometric re-authentication on the selected high-risk functions, not on everything
- Dual approval on payment runs, with both approvers verified
- Checkpoints on vendor master data, budget changes, requisitions and goods receipts
- Tamper-proof logging of every protected action, including refused attempts
The model is Zero Trust applied inside SAP: nobody is trusted until they are confirmed, which closes the route an unauthorized user would otherwise take through somebody else’s permitted account.
The outcome
- The true identity of the user is reconfirmed at the moment any sensitive SAP function is attempted
- Both internal users with general permissions and external attackers with valid credentials are stopped at the same checkpoint
- Public expenditure functions carry a record of who performed them, not of which account was used